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Knowledge in four deformation dimensions
Abstract
This paper sketches out a complexity conceptualization of knowledge. Building from
evolutionary theories, it defines knowledge as rules that reduce environmental
uncertainty through connections between ideas and facts. Following, knowledge is
conceived as a structure validated through action, a process contextualized in
individual experience and a system contextualized in social and cultural experience.
Knowledge exhibits four characteristics of of a complex system: it is ensitive to initial
conditions, it exhibits multiple feedback loops, it is non-linear, and recursively
symmetrical Four inter-dependent deformation dimensions of knowledge are
identified (personal, common, tacit, and explicit) and their interactions are discussed.
This conceptualization of knowledge as a complex system contributes to the
knowledge-based theory of the firm by providing some micro-foundations to
organizational knowledge, and it opens the opportunity to re-think theories about
communities of practice, entrepreneurship and firm creation, the role of managers,
and knowledge management.
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Introduction
Research dealing with knowledge in organizations has highlighted two principal sets
of polar opposites: on the one hand tacit versus explicit knowledge (e.g. Cowan,
David & Foray, 2000), and on the other hand individual versus group knowledge (e.g.
Brown & Duguid, 1998). To date, these have been conceptualized as types of
knowledge, and much of the literature on knowledge management has been concerned
with how to convert, translate or transform one type of knowledge into another (e.g.
Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995) and how to generate new knowledge from existing
knowledge (e.g. Hargadon & Sutton, 1997) in order to generate innovations and gain
competitive advantage. This is consistent with the assumptions underlying
knowledge-based theories of the firm (e.g. Grant, 1996b): knowledge is arguably a
firm's most valuable asset (Winter, 1987) because it may well be the only reliable
source of competitive advantage in a post-industrial economy (Drucker, 1993). And
also with dynamic capabilities theories of competitive advantage (e.g. Eisenhardt &
Martin, 2000) in the sense that the creation of new knowledge, in other words
organizational learning (Brown & Duguid, 1991), sustains the renewal of capabilities
(Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). The above arguments have led to recommend that firms
should actively manage their knowledge assets (Lei, Hitt & Bettis, 1996) thereby
legitimizing knowledge management as a strategic activity (Alvesson & Karreman,
2001).
This broad literature on knowledge and organizations defines a field of research, but
does not form an integrated and consistent theoretical paradigm (Kuhn, 1970) as it
harbors significant debates and controversies. The way knowledge has been defined
has been criticized at times for confusing knowledge and information (Potts, 2001:
424) or for its poor construction: "the logic seems to be as follows: «we don't know
what knowledge is but it seems to solve problems in a functional way, so let's use it
anyway»" (Alvesson & Karreman, 2001: 999). The distinction between tacit and
explicit knowledge has been under attack as a misinterpretation of Polanyi's original
argument that they are complementary (Polanyi, 1967), not substituable (Thompson &
Walsham, 2004). Similarly, opposing individual and collective knowledge has been
argued to make little sense as they are mutually defined (Tsoukas, 1996: 14) and
knowledge-based theories of the firm have been criticized for failing to articulate
clearly the build-up from individual to organizational knowledge (Foss, 1999: 741).
Finally, the notion that knowledge is an asset has been critiqued as too narrow and
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static for it ignores the dynamic and processual perspectives on knowledge and
learning (Chia, 2003).
In this paper, I offer some arguments for a re-thinking of the theories of knowledge
and organization that goes some way towards addressing the above criticisms.
Implicit in the majority of the research in the field is the assumption that relatively
simple, linear, frameworks are appropriate to study and theorize about knowledge.
Building on evolutionary theories, I present a conceptualization of knowledge as a
complex system, for which non-linear models and concepts drawn from complexity
theory are appropriate. In this perspective, tacit, explicit, personal, and common
knowledge are defined as interdependent deformation dimensions that interact
dynamically, rather than types of knowledge which can be substituted one for another.
Proceeding in this way leads to challenge some conclusions and recommendations
from established theories about knowledge and its management, the role of managers,
and why knowledge is an appropriate foundation for a theory of the firm. This
discussion incorporates complexity theory as a metaphor. Arguably, such a narrative
approach is more appropriate to organizational analysis than a direct application of the
models of complexity theory (e.g: McKelvey, 1999) because it allows to capture the
evolutionary nature of organizational contexts (Thiétart & Forgues, 1995). There are
two key arguments in favor of a qualitative, rather than quantitative, reference to
complexity theory. First, firms do not emerge spontaneously, they are human
creations, both in the sense that as legal institutions they are the product of
interactions between individuals in the context of society (North, 1991), but also in
the more immediate sense that they are created by entrepreneurs (Schumpeter, 1934).
Second, organizations are more complex than living organisms in the sense that they
are capable of structural change in ways that the models of complexity find difficult to
account for (Thiétart & Forgues, 1995: 22).
In the first section, I define knowledge as an evolutionary and dynamic process of
uncertainty reduction. In the second section I elaborate on this definition to present a
conceptualization of knowledge as a complex system. In the third section, the
interdependencies between tacit, explicit, personal and common knowledge are
explored. Finally I conclude with a discussion of the implications of this re-thinking
for management practice and research.
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An evolutionary perspective on knowledge and uncertainty
By analogy with economic theories, evolutionary theories can be sorted according to
their underlying assumptions about efficiency (Vromen, 1995: 60). On the one hand
are neoDarwinian theories making "strongform" hypotheses about the efficiency of
selection processes (Gould, 1982; Arrow, 1962) leading to model the selection
process as the survival of the fittest and the systematic elimination of weak species,
either in natural environments or in markets. Such "strongform" theories allow for
equilibrium and optimization of performance. One of the arguments advanced against
"strongform" evolutionary theories is that they ignore intentionality and purpose in
evolutionary processes: environments may sometimes be responsible for extinction,
but never for survival (Loasby, 2002; von Glasersfeld, 1984). This has led to
formulating evolutionary theories with "weakform" assumptions about the efficiency
of the selection process, where "selection discards what is not compatible with
survival and reproduction" (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1993: 195) leading to a less
stringent process retaining all those that fit, not merely the fittest. These evolutionary
theories incorporating "weakform" assumptions allow for ambiguity and lead to
satisficing rather than optimizing performance (Heiner, 1983). In the rest of this
discussion, I will draw from "weakform" evolutionary theories.
A central feature of evolutionary processes is uncertainty. The main concern of living
beings and organizations is how to secure survival in the context of an uncertain
environment. Environmental uncertainty can be divided into two dimensions:
procedural and fundamental uncertainty (Dequech, 2004). Procedural uncertainty is
linked to the perceptual and cognitive limitations of actors. Sensory organs are
selective about which environmental features they are sensitive to (Moreno, Umerez
& Ibanez, 1997) implying that it is not possible to gather all potentially relevant
information: the limitations of sensory organs thus engender perceptual uncertainty.
Further, limitations of the cognitive apparatus -bounded rationality- imply that it is not
possible to fully attend to the complexity of the environment, leading to inaccurate
interpretations and predictions (McFadden, 1999). Fundamental uncertainty relates to
the complexity and unpredictability of the environment. Environmental complexity
implies that attribution of cause and effect is not always reliable, leading to
unforeseen consequences (Perrow, 1984). Unpredictability implies that the probability
of occurrence of events cannot always be precisely ascertained (Knight, 1921 [1971]).
Thus, even if actors could be capable of accurate and complete perceptions and
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faultless information processing, they would not be able to select the most appropriate
course of action due to the complexity and unpredictability of the environment
(Heiner, 1983).
In evolutionary biology as well as economics, uncertainty is associated with lack of
knowledge and the problem of survival (Dequech, 2004; Christensen & Hooker,
2000). Even in the context of "weakform" selection processes, survival is by no means
assured: multiple and potentially conflicting objectives (e.g. sleeping versus gathering
food) must be satisfied in time and space, within the context of an uncertain
environment. Through trial and error, individuals progressively discover heuristics
that provide satisfactory solutions to the problem of survival. At root, knowledge is
thus a behavioral rule that has been tried and successfully implemented (Potts, 2001).
Knowledge is different from facts and ideas in the sense that it consists of connections
between ideas and facts. Knowledge reduces uncertainty by establishing such
connections, and gains justification through successful action. In this sense,
knowledge is "blind": the search for new knowledge is not random, it is directed by
the intentionality to find a solution to a perceived problem, however its validity
cannot be ascertained ex-ante (Campbell, 1960). This rejoins Ryle's insight that
knowing "how" precedes knowing "that" (Ryle, 1949), in other words: "theory
follows after, rather than being presupposed by, concrete accomplishment" (Rorty,
1991: 79).
Thus far we have a root definition of knowledge as a system of connections between
facts and ideas that enable survival by reducing environmental uncertainty. For
example, female mosquitoes resolve the environmental uncertainty of finding the
"blood hosts" necessary to egg production by tracking heat and CO2 (Christensen &
Hooker, 2000:12). In this case, the knowledge connections are structured as follows:
heat + CO2 = blood host. However, the cognitive ability of the female mosquito is
extremely limited: it is able to acquire knowledge about blood hosts by following only
one uncertainty reduction process (tracking heat and CO2), and its knowledge remains
wholly implicit. Other species have more extended capabilities, leading to a hierarchy
of behavioral repertoires, from relatively simple and fixed behavioral patterns to
increasingly complex activity, and greater flexibility to adjust behavior in the face of
unforeseen events (Christensen & Hooker, 1999). Living beings with greater
cognitive capacities are able to resort to a more varied repertoire of uncertainty
reduction processes, and more importantly they are capable of generating new
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uncertainty reduction processes. For example, a cheetah is capable of evaluating its
own performance when chasing a gazelle, and it can modify its behavior in order to
achieve a successful outcome, by adapting its chase to the evasive moves of the
gazelle. Thus, the cheetah exhibits what can be called first-order complexity in its
ability to generate knowledge: it can learn about its prey (simple knowledge) and it
can learn about generating new behavioral rules, generating new connections between
facts and ideas, as it is attempting to resolve environmental uncertainty (in the case of
chasing the gazelle, the uncertainty is about finding food). This distinction between
simple knowledge and first order complex knowledge parallels Argyris and Schon's
(1978) distinction between single loop and double loop learning. But knowledge
generation is not limited to direct experience.
Living beings capable of sophisticated, abstract, symbolic communication display
second-order complexity (Tsoukas & Hatch, 2001) in their generation of knowledge
connections by using language and artifacts as scaffolds for cognitive activity
(Anderson, 2003). Cognitive scaffolds are useful on two counts. First, they provide a
reliable way to store previously acquired knowledge: memory differs from
information retrieval because it involves the (re)construction of sense from past
experience and allows for variations (Bartlett, 1932). For example, the very shape of a
scythe indicates the proper move to cut wheat at harvest time. A tool thus embodies
the knowledge that was used to create it, and using the tool is like remembering, it
leads to the re-creation of that knowledge (Bachimont, 2005: 95). Second, cognitive
scaffolds allow for the accumulation of ever greater quantities of knowledge, going
beyond the cognitive ability of a single individual (Lorenz, 2001). Scaffolding allows
knowledge generation in abstraction of direct experience, but it also influences how
these knowledge-related activities are conducted and unfold. Knowledge of first-order
complexity is contextualized in individual experience, knowledge of second-order
complexity is contextualized in social and cultural experience, incorporated in
artifacts, symbols and language. Therefore, knowledge of second-order complexity is
not validated through direct successful experience but through social processes of
intersubjectivity (Passeron, 1996). In that sense, knowledge is not "truthful" but
"verisimilar" (Tsoukas & Hatch, 2001). This is consistent with the assumptions of
procedural and fundamental uncertainty of the evolutionary perspective which imply
that the uncertainty of the environment cannot be fully resolved.
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Knowledge as a complex system
From the preceding discussion, knowledge appears in three forms: it is a structure, a
process, and a system. Simple knowledge, that of the mosquito, consists of rule
directing behavior instantiated in stable connections between facts and ideas. In this
form, knowledge is a structure. Knowledge of first-order complexity incorporates
feedback loops that allow for the emergence of new rules: knowledge is there seen as
a process. Second-order complexity adds reflexivity: the scaffolding of cognitive
activity through artifacts and language implies that knowledge is also a network of
rule generating processes inter-linked through social interaction (Potts, 2001). Thus,
the evolutionary perspective leads to a dynamic conceptualization of knowledge. In
this light, knowledge exhibits characteristics of a complex system: it is sensitive to
initial conditions, replete with feedback loops, non-linear, and recursively
symmetrical (Holbrook, 2003). I discuss each in turn, with a particular emphasis on
recursive symmetry, a topic not hitherto discussed.
Procedural and fundamental uncertainty combine to make the circumstances presiding
to the emergence of new knowledge highly unpredictable. Knowledge processes
unfold through space and time and are influenced by actors' intentions about the
future, present actions and past experiences. Lane and Maxfield's (2005) account of
technological innovation -arguably one instance of new knowledge generation- as a
continuously re-interpreted narrative laden with surprises and new plot twists
illustrates this sensitivity to initial conditions.
Knowledge as a process integrates many feedback loops. The evaluation of its
performance compared to intentions or expectations (catching the gazelle) informs the
learning of the cheetah (adjusting the chase to the evasive actions of the prey). At the
level of second-order complexity, the validation of knowledge through social
interaction also provides for powerful feedback loops: indeed, Latour (1987) even
argues that the validation of new scientific knowledge has greater dependency on
networks of social support than on the intrinsic qualities of the new theory.
Successfully reducing environmental uncertainty involves satisfying multiple and
potentially conflicting criteria over time: this is an open-ended problem which does
not lend itself to the formulation of an optimal solution ex-ante, but rather to the
construction of a satisficing solution through a process of trial and error, where
behavior is progressively tuned to attain successful performance (Christensen &
Hooker, 2000). Such processes cannot be modeled through linear, cause-and-effect
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relationships, due to the impossibility of eliminating procedural and environmental
uncertainty, thus calling for dynamical models (van Gelder, 1995).
Finally, knowledge is symmetrically recursive: it exhibits the same characteristics at
different scales. At the level of individuals, knowledge consists of heuristics that
reduce environmental uncertainty. Some of these heuristics give rise to social
constructions: institutions (North, 1991), informal constraints and formal rules that
emerge out of social interactions to stabilize behavior and reduce environmental
uncertainty. These rules, sometimes also called routines (Becker, 2004) or
conventions (Lewis, 1983) have been arbitrarily selected, and their value does not
reside in their performative efficience, but in their relative stability in time and space.
Heiner (1983) argues that the value attributed to stability is inversely related to the
unpredictability of the environment: greater unpredictability is matched with greater
behavioral stability, even at the expense of decreased performance, as the cost of
finding an improved behavioral rule exceeds the potential gain in performance.
Organizations, as a form of institution perform a second role in reducing uncertainty:
they help alleviate some of the limitations inherent to individual cognition by
operating a division of labor at the level of knowledge: they allow people to confront
only a portion of environmental uncertainty, commensurate with the bounds of their
cognitive abilities (Loasby, 1999). This division of labor implies that organizations
are distributed knowledge systems, where everybody holds some of the collective
knowledge but nobody holds all of it, and their successful operation implies the
establishment of "collective mind" (Weick & Roberts, 1993). Organizations operating
as collective minds face environmental uncertainty in much the same way that
individuals do. Like individual living beings, organizations are dissipative systems:
"organizations, thought to be stable, in fact keep falling apart and need elaborate
maintenance systems to wards off threats to stability" (Weick, 1979: 58).
Organizations need to secure resources in order to satisfy the conflicting needs of their
stakeholders (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978): just like individuals, organizations have to
solve divergent problems that afford many satisficing solutions (Kogut & Zander,
1996: 514). They do so by finding satisficing routines through processes of trial and
error (Cyert & March, 1963). In this process, organizations interact with each other
and thus generate higher-level institutions: interactions between firms in markets lead
to the emergence of "industry recipes" (Spender, 1983) where the successful
knowledge generated by pioneering firms is imitated by others (DiMaggio & Powell,
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1983). In this process, firms also establish networks of stable cooperative
relationships which help to reduce uncertainty, and thus leverage and simultaneously
constrain their actions (Gulati, Nohria & Zaheer, 2000). The relationships within these
networks lead to the emergence of common understandings of industry practices and
the replication of knowledge, mirroring the relationships established by individuals
within communities of practice (Wenger, 1998). This leads to the establishment of
behavioral regularities between organizations, which enable the coordination of their
action. Networks thus do for organizations what organizations do for individuals: they
operate a division of labor between firms, and reduce fundamental uncertainty by
establishing predictable behaviors. Kogut (2000: 410) further notes that these
behavioral regularities that emerge from these processes are "«irrational» from a
perspective of economic organization": just like the routines that emerge between
individuals, their value is in their relative stability, not in their performative
efficience. Thus we find that knowledge as behavioral rules exhibits similar
characteristics for individuals, organizations, and networks of organizations: it is
symmetrically recursive. It is worth noting in this perspective that if uncertainty is
reduced through division of labor and the imitation of successful heuristics at each
level, it is not eliminated from the environment. Rather it is displaced to ever higher
levels of integration: thus the concept of knowledge as a complex system is structured
as a series of hierarchically nested levels which mirrors the structure of the universe in
complexity theory (Holbrook, 2003: 22-23).
Conceptualizing knowledge in processual terms as a complex system leads to
challenging traditional thinking about knowledge in terms of distinct, substituable
types such as individual versus collective, or tacit versus explicit (Spender, 1998).
Thinking in terms of substitutable types of knowledge appears to invariably lead to
dismiss one of the terms of the alternative. For example, Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995:
239) dismiss the collective dimension of knowledge when they assert that "only
individuals think". Similarly, Cowan et al. (2000) dismiss the tacit dimension of
knowledge when they propose that all knowledge, potentially, may be codified. Such
views have been criticized for over-simplifying knowledge: these "types" are
interdependent and mutually constructed, rather than independent and substituable
one from another (Nightingale, 2003). Thus it may be more appropriate to think of
knowledge as consisting of interdependent dimensions. Complex systems are
characterized by tolerance norms: they must remain within these boundaries, or
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otherwise collapse into chaos (Holbrook, 2003). The state of a complex system is
informed by deformation dimensions that indicate how it has evolved relative to its
initial state and its deformation limits (Ricordeau, 1997). Unlike traditional Euclidian
coordinate dimensions that provide positions along a linear axis moving from infinity
(-∞)to infinity (+∞), deformation dimensions provide positions moving between 0
and 1 on a circular axis. Figure 1 illustrates how deformation dimensions operate: the
measure of the contrast of an image moves from 0 (all white -no contrast) to 1 (50%
white, 50% black) back to 0 (all black, no contrast).
__________
Insert Figure 1 about here
__________
Thinking of knowledge in terms of deformation dimensions allows to capture the
interdependence between tacit, explicit, personal and common knowledge: what
matters may not be how much it is one or the other, but how much it has changed over
time in each dimension. In the next section, I discuss each dimension in turn, then
their relationships.
Four deformation dimensions of knowledge
The first dimension of knowledge is personal (Polanyi, 1962). The personal
dimension refers to the embodiment of knowledge: it is nestled in an individual with
differentiated perceptual and cognitive abilities. Personal knowledge consists of the
behavioral rules developed by that particular individual through reduction of
environmental uncertainty. This set of rules is evolutionary, but at the same time, it is
relatively stable and defines identity.
The second dimension of knowledge is common (Lewis, 1983). This dimension
captures the embeddedness of knowledge: knowledge is not generated in a vacuum,
but in an interactive environment (Anderson, 2003). Second order complexity implies
social interaction through language, symbols, and artifacts: the scaffolding of
cognition that enables abstract knowledge is contextualized, and knowledge must be
shared for intersubjective validation to occur.
Tacit is the third dimension. This captures the processual nature of knowledge: as we
are generating new knowledge in action, we are not necessarily attentive to the
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knowledge for we are attending to the action (Chia, 2003). This reflects the bounds of
cognition, and the fact that knowledge has a from-to structure: "we are attending from
the theory to things seen in its light, and are aware of the theory, while using it, in
terms of the spectacle that it serves to explain" (Polanyi, 1967: 17).
The fourth dimension is explicit. It refers to the retrospective unfolding of the
knowledge process: once skilful performance has been achieved, it is possible to
reflect and theorize about it (Ryle, 1949). Explicit knowledge thus leads to
formalization and codification (Johnson, Lorenz & Lundvall, 2002).
As argued before, the four dimensions are interdependent and complementary, rather
than independent and substituable. In the remainder of this section, I explore the
relationships between the dimensions of knowledge. Relationships and interactions
are operating on all dimensions simultaneously, but for the sake of clarity of
exposition, this discussion will proceed by examining six pairs of interactions:
personal - common, personal - tacit, personal - explicit, common - tacit, common -
explicit, tacit - explicit. Together, these six pairs of relationships constitute a network
of linkages, and provide an illustration of the systemic nature of knowledge.
Personal and common
Personal and common knowledge are mutually constituted. On the one hand, personal
knowledge is built on common knowledge: classic research in psychology has shown
that social interactions and language play a decisive influence in children's cognitive
development (Piaget, 1976). Before it is possible for someone to learn to speak, there
must be a language (Lorenz, 2001) in this instance, common knowledge precedes
personal knowledge. Language acquisition is more than the mere learning of codes
and symbols: it is a developmental process of differentiation and generalization,
where conceptual thought progressively emerges: thought "does not merely find
expression in speech: it finds its reality and form" (Vygotsky, 1962: 126). The
processes of knowledge development at the individual level is are inseparable from
artifacts and social interaction: personal knowledge is embedded in a wider socio-
historical context which influences how it unfolds. On the other hand, common
knowledge is progressively enriched by personal knowledge. Latour's (1987) studies
of diffusion of scientific knowledge provide a template to describe how the process
unfold. Scientific theory start as contestable assertions expressed by one researcher
(or a small group of researchers) based on observations of laboratory experiments.
These assertions are spread outside the laboratory through artifacts: publications,
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equipment, software, etc. These are then supported by networks of support: other
researchers and institutions. Claims spread through these networks through the re-
creation of the original experiments. The fate of individual claims is decided by the
size of the networks and the variety of artifacts produced. Once challenges to
theoretical claims stop, knowledge has been established: "the final transformation of a
statement into a fact occurs when all traces of human agency are erased and replaced
with a natural order. In this case, a statement has become so strong that it becomes
part of the accepted background knowledge of science and perhaps society at large"
(Ward, 1996: 100). Thus personal and common knowledge are mutually constituted,
but this does not imply that they are the same: assuming that one individual, because
her personal knowledge has been constructed from that of her social environment,
holds in her knowledge all the knowledge of her society would assume potentially
unlimited absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) and would dismiss the
notion that common knowledge is distributed (Tsoukas, 1996). Conversely, assuming
that an individual's knowledge only consists of the knowledge of his social
environment would lead to negate his identity.
Personal and tacit
The interaction between these two dimensions highlights the experiential nature of
knowledge: personal knowledge is embodied, and tacit knowledge is instantiated in
action. According to Ryle (1949: 30) the interplay between these two dimensions of
knowledge is the necessary precondition to the formulation of propositional
knowledge: "it is therefore possible for people intelligently to perform some sorts of
operations when they are not yet able to consider any propositions enjoining how they
should be performed". Ryle further insists that the other sequence, involving
theoretical knowledge guiding successful performance is absurd: if this were the case,
then it would be impossible for anyone to create any new knowledge. The
combination of personal and tacit knowledge thus highlight that knowledge is not
only a set of rules linking facts and ideas, but also a capacity to act, an ability to apply
the rules even when one is not aware of their explicit formulation (Chia, 2003).
Personal and explicit
If knowledge initially stems from successful physical action, it does not necessarily
mean that all new knowledge is tacit before it is explicit. The level of second order
complexity suggests that cognitive activity in itself is a valid way to generate new
knowledge. However, this does not occur through the algorythmic manipulation of
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symbolic representation as argued by proponents of cybernetics or artificial
intelligence (Anderson, 2003). Rather, another kind of symbolic manipulation, where
the symbols are concrete rather than abstract, localized rather than universal is
suggested by analogical reasoning (Gentner, 1983). This is when the properties of
something already known are mapped onto a new object as a metaphor, in order to
gain knowledge about the new object. It has been argued that such analogical
reasoning, combining personal experience and symbolic manipulation of metaphors,
is a rich source for new technological innovations (Magee, 2005), scientific theories
(Cornelissen, 2005) and strategic breakthroughs (Gavetti, Levinthal & Rivkin, 2005).
Common and tacit
Organizations reduce uncertainty in two ways: by operating a division of labor at the
level of knowledge, and by instituting stable behavioral patterns. This requires both
coordination (Kogut & Zander, 1996) and cooperation (Grant, 1996a). Coordination is
achieved through a set of shared conventions (Lewis, 1983), regularities in belief or
action that everyone conforms to, and expects everyone else to conform to. As
conventions are arbitrary, they are not necessarily the most efficient, but their stability
provides for satisficing levels of performance. Cooperation is obtained through
convergence on means, the operation of mutually beneficial actions. Weick (1979)
suggests that this is achieved through stable patterns of interaction: interlocked
behaviors. Over time, such interlocked behaviors give rise to routines, established in
action and as such wholly tacit (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994). Thus, knowledge that is
both common and tacit is at the heart of the foundations of knowledge-based theories
of the firm. In this perspective, firms exist because they allow to reduce uncertainty in
ways that are complementary to other types of institutions (North, 1993), not because
they are the outcome of "market failures" (Williamson, 1975), nor because they
contain "more of it" (Kogut & Zander, 1996: 516).
Common and explicit
At the core of the interaction between the common and explicit dimensions of
knowledge is Wittgenstein's insight that there can be no private language
(Wittgenstein, 1953). Though common knowledge need not be explicit, much of our
common knowledge is expressed formally. This is due to the fact that knowledge that
is not experiential, knowledge of second-order complexity, finds justification not in
successful action but through social processes of intersubjectivity. The processes of
validation of scientific knowledge described by Latour (discussed above) rely
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crucially on artifacts: knowledge that has been formalized, and expressed in explicit
ways.
Tacit and explicit
Polanyi's phenomenological approach to tacit knowledge is founded on the interplay
between tacit and explicit knowledge. Because of the limitations of our cognitive
apparatus, we can only focus consciously on one task at a time, and thus tacit
knowledge is used to make sense of explicit knowledge: knowledge has a from-to
structure (Polanyi, 1967: x). The interdependence between tacit and explicit
knowledge at the level of individuals identified by Polanyi finds mirror images at the
levels of organizations and networks of organizations: knowledge exhibits recursive
symmetry, and so do the relationships between knowledge dimensions. Within
organizations, tacit routines and conventions perform a critical role: as informal
practices, they inform and frame the application of formal rules (Crozier, 1980) as no
set of rules can envision all contingencies (Tsoukas, 1996: 16). Relationships between
organizations within networks of wholly informal relationships, guided by implicit
rules exhibit the same properties: "the network is itself knowledge, not in the sense of
providing access to distributed information and capabilities, but in representing a form
of coordination guided by enduring principles of coordination" (Kogut, 2000: 407).
This set of interactions allow to account for the richness of knowledge as a concept.
The complexity conceptualization of knowledge also suggests that many contradictory
results of extant research related to knowledge in organizations -for example that
knowledge can be managed, provided that the appropriate systems and processes are
in place (Soo, Devinney, Midgley & Deering, 2002) versus the view that it cannot be
managed (Alvesson & Karreman, 2001)- are not necessarily the outcomes of mutually
exclusive perspectives, but also reflect complementary, albeit partial, views of the
same phenomena. The depth of the complexity perspective offers opportunities to re-
frame and re-interpret past results, and to open new avenues for research. In the next
section I explore some of these, and attend to communities of practice,
entrepreneurship, the role of managers, and knowledge management from the
complexity view of knowledge.
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Contributions to a knowledge-based complexity theory of organizations
Dimensions of knowledge and communities of practice
The interactions between the four dimensions of knowledge provide the opportunity
to enhance and extend the arguments put forward by researchers focusing on
communities of practice. One of the salient features of shared workgroup identities is
that they enable the integration of individual knowledge (Brown & Duguid, 1991).
This shared context provides for the tacit cues that enable the sharing of knowledge,
through the interpretation and re-interpretation of stories and narratives (Patriotta,
2003). The existence of these shared frames explains why knowledge is more easily
shared within than between communities (Cook & Brown, 1999). Research on
communities of practices thus explore the common, tacit, and explicit dimensions of
knowledge. But this strand of research pays relatively less attention to the personal
dimension of knowledge and the role of scaffolding and action in knowledge re-
creation. The complexity perspective suggests that the process of knowledge sharing
is not complete until knowledge has been re-enacted. The "war stories" shared by
photocopier technicians (Orr, 1996) or call-center operators (Tsoukas & Vladimirou,
2001) only become salient in action, they are validated in a process similar to that of
researchers when they re-construct in the laboratory the experimental results reported
in scientific journals by their colleagues (Latour, 1987). Thus to acquire new
knowledge on the basis of the experience of another member of the community, an
individual must possess the background knowledge necessary to make sense of the
narrative, and then re-create in action the experience that was related. Much like
remembering for an individual involves the re-production of a memory, the process of
sharing knowledge within a community of practice is only complete when it is re-
created in action. The argumentation proposed here does not deny the relevance of
communities of practice as a focus for analysis and research, but leads to a more
measured view on some claims about knowledge sharing and transfer, in that sharing
and interpreting narratives is only the first step of a process of knowledge re-creation.
In this perspective it is worth remembering that communities embody only one level
of knowledge processes (Crossan, Lane & White, 1999): the work of a community
needs to be coordinated with that of the other units within the firm. Communities are
embedded in a wider context (Nonaka & Konno, 1998) and their contributions cannot
always be understood in isolation.
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Initial conditions and entrepreneurship
Initial conditions have a critical influence on the evolution of firms as knowledge-
based complex systems (Anderson, 1999: 217). Thus the complexity concept of
knowledge has relevance for entrepreneurship and new business creation. Spender
(1998: 247) argued that entrepreneurs select both the environmental uncertainty their
new firm resolves and its initial endowment of components and structure.
Organizational culture and identity then emerge from these initial conditions through
the interactions of the components and the environment. The complexity concept of
knowledge leads to reverse this perspective: the notion of organizations emerging out
of interlocked behaviors suggests that people start to cooperate by converging on
common means first: common ends come second (Weick, 1979: 90-95). In other
words entrepreneurs start by creating a company, establishing shared values and
identity before they select which products and services to offer (Collins & Porras,
1995: 81-87). In other words organizational culture and values shape the interactions
with the environment (Tsoukas, 1998) before they evolve through feedback loops.
The manager's job
The perspective of complexity frames managers in a paradoxical situation: because
they are part of the causal loops they try to comprehend, their understanding is
imperfect and their actions impact with unintended consequences the processes they
are trying to control (Tsoukas & Hatch, 2001). The knowledge-based theory of the
firm suggests that organizations reduce environmental uncertainty through two
mechanisms: first, they discover successful heuristics through processes of trial and
error; second, they scaffold their search on the knowledge held by other organizations
in their networks of relationships. This suggests two dimensions for the role of the
manager.
The first dimension is rule distillation. This is an emergent process, drawing on
reflexive observation of the interactions of the firm with its environment: rules
proceed from successful performance, they do not precede it. By stepping back from
the action, managers can best position themselves to reflect on the performance of
their collaborators and devise rules for action. But the dynamic nature of knowledge
processes implies that rules and routines are evolutionary and do not suffice in
themselves to stabilize organizations. Cooperation is sustained by regularities in
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behavior, coordination is sustained by regularities in belief. Values form the
background to make sense of organizational knowledge and action. This suggests that
managers create value for their organizations by bestowing them values (Weick,
1995). As mentioned before, managerial actions interact with the processes they
intend to manage: this suggests that organizations may be monitored -their
performance can be recorded ex-post- but not controlled through the setting of targets
ex-ante. This does not mean that managers should disregard objectives and targets,
rather they should concern themselves with the values they embody.
The second dimension is boundary management. Previous research suggests that
organizations develop one dominant knowledge process (Daft & Weick, 1984) and
that knowledge exploration entails investments and processes incompatible with
knowledge exploitation (Wright, Van Wijk & Bouty, 1995). Thus trying to
accommodate different knowledge processes within the boundaries of the
organization (e.g: Nonaka & Toyama, 2002) may not always be met with success.
Rather, managers should think about organizational boundaries outwards as well as
inwards: managers may find that network partners hold knowledge that complements
their own (Kogut, 2000). In this respect, outsourcing knowledge work that is not well
supported by the firm's dominant process makes sense (Quinn, 2000).
The complexity lens thus leads to define the manager's job in terms of shaping the
context of organizational activity (rules, values, boundaries) rather than directing
organizational action. By shaping the context of organizational action managers
enable (and perhaps also sometimes disable) the performances of other organizational
actors. It is in this respect that organizations are more than mere aggregations of teams
and communities of practice: subgroupings may hold differentiated identities, but they
also share common values. Organizations are contexts in which activity systems
unfold, and corporate failures and "normal accidents" (Perrow, 1984) are not usually
the result of faulty rules or individual failures, rather they are more likely the
consequence of mindless cooperation and breakdowns in coordination (Weick &
Roberts, 1993).
Implications for knowledge management
The previous section has far-reaching implications for knowledge management as an
organizational activity: if organizations cannot be controlled, can knowledge be
managed? If knowledge is not transferred, but re-created in action, can knowledge-
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processes be reliably directed? As such, it appears that knowledge cannot be managed
in the functionalist sense of the term, and this is in great part reflected by the
evolution of knowledge management theories since the early 1990s (cf. Snowden,
2002). Does this imply that organizations should give up on knowledge management?
The description of the manager's job suggests that knowledge management is like all
other managerial activities: it requires second-order complex thinking and action.
Managers cannot directly manage knowledge, but they can purposefully influence the
contexts in which knowledge processes unfold. By acting indirectly on knowledge
processes, managers can escape the chaotic loop of trying to control a process in
which they are embedded. Paying attention to the four dimensions of knowledge is
useful in this context: too often, knowledge management efforts emphasize the
common and explicit dimensions because they appear more readily controllable. Our
discussion suggests that the interaction of personal and explicit knowledge in
analogical reasoning (as opposed to digital processing) may hold great potential for
knowledge creation. Finally, the notion that the re-creation of knowledge in action is
not a like-for-like process of reproduction suggests that the interaction between
personal and tacit knowledge has also relevance for the management of creativity and
innovation.
A complementary approach to the question of the management of knowledge is the
question whether knowledge is an asset. If knowledge consists of connections
between ideas and facts, then the growth of knowledge is effected through the
creation of new connections, but also the destruction of connections. In other words,
the evolution of knowledge cannot be tracked by the density of connections -greater
density is not associated with more or better knowledge- neither is it associated to the
stocks of facts or ideas, rather the evolution of knowledge is quite possibly
independent of these -more facts and/or more ideas do not necessarily convert into
more knowledge (Potts, 2001). Therefore thinking of knowledge in terms of a stock or
asset makes little sense, and this is a second reason why knowledge cannot be
managed.
Pfeffer and Sutton (1999) in a paper on knowledge management propose that high
performance is driven by knowing "why", rather than knowing "how" or "what", a
proposal consistent with the argumentation put forward in the preceding paragraph.
The authors also argue that there is a “knowing-doing gap” (Pfeffer & Sutton, 1999:
85) between identified good practice and its implementation by organizations,
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implying that organizations know more than they do. They attribute this discrepancy
to the difficulty of transferring knowledge and best practices between and within
organizations, and to various forms of organizational inertia. But in doing so, Pfeffer
& Sutton fall into the trap of believing that there is a “ghost in the machine”(Ryle,
1949): they assume that because explicit knowledge has been diffused then it can be
applied -in other words that theory precedes action- and that it is enough for the CEO
to order that a technique be implemented that it will -there is a central controller in the
organization directing the work of other, a “brain” controling the “body”. In doing so,
the authors are downplaying the complexity of knowledge, and the subtlety and
dynamics of knowledge processes. As argued previously, the diffusion of explicit
knowledge is only one step in the knowledge re-creation process. Successful
knowledge re-creation also implies a shared cognitive frame, and the individual
appropriation of knowledge through successful action. This suggests that the gap may
wel be the other way around: it could be a “doing-knowing” gap. Before they can 
adopt improved practices, organizations must first reflect on their existing routines
and procedures and understand how these impact performance. This also suggests that
organizations may also need to "forget" (de Holan, Phillips & Lawrence, 2004) before
they can improve their performance.
Implications for research
The conceptualization of knowledge outlined in this paper also has implications for
theory making as a knowledge process. The lens of knowledge as a complex system
suggests that like that of the manager, the work of the researcher may be paradoxical.
The complexity of multi-dimensional, complex, rich, knowledge processes call for
multi-faceted, longitudinal, narrative case studies in order to capture the complexity of
the phenomena they are attempting to study (Tsoukas & Hatch, 2001) and build
longitudinal analytical frameworks to capture interactions over time (Langley, 1999).
At first sight, the call to incorporate detailed, multi-faceted narratives in research
under the complexity framework would seem to sacrifice simplicity for accuracy and
generality. However, two arguments weigh in favor of another trade-off. First, the
notion that complex systems are governed by simple rules implies that simplicity may
not be sacrificed. Second, it can also be argued that organization studies cannot be
purged of local contingencies: Tsoukas (2001: 10). So that theories should be tailored
for local contexts: accurate and simple, but not necessarily general.
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Mahoney and Sanchez (2004) put forward similar arguments and advocate a process
of research and theory making where managers have a bigger place. The authors
suggest that academic researchers make explicit the tacit knowledge managers have
accumulated through action and incorporate it in their theories. They argue that this is
a way to produce research with greater relevance and practical applicability. The
theory of knowledge as a complex system suggests that there might be more to the
research process, and that subordinating researchers' activities to managerial
preoccupations may not be advisable at all times. This is not because research is a
"noble" activity with a higher status than mundane managerial tasks, but because
theories do not describe a world "out there" waiting to be discovered, but means to act
in the world, and in doing so, shape it (Hatchuel, 2005). Theory making is about
reflexive tool-building, involving recursive processes of trial-and-error, where skillful
performance appears first, and then is generalized into a theory for action. The
complexity frame calls for an evolutionary theorizing process, but not necessarily one
that operates only in the head of the researcher (Weick, 1989). This is the second
paradox of knowledge as a complex system: researchers need to act before they can
theorize. This does not exclude intentionality and problem-solving goals, but requires
for interactive research set-ups where managers are involved at all stages, for example
action research (Reason & Bradbury, 2001). It is in a second phase that researchers
can reflect and theorize, with the aim of informing future action.
Conclusion
The evolutionary perspective deployed in this paper has lead to define knowledge as a
complex system made up of four deformation dimensions. In this view, knowledge is
simultaneously:
- A structure: a set of connections between ideas and facts that reduce environmental
uncertainty and produce heuristics guiding action. In that sense, knowledge is a
capacity to act.
- A process: knowledge of first-order complexity incorporates feedback loops that
enable the generation of new heuristics, it is contextualized in individual experience.
- A system: knowledge of second-order complexity scaffolds on artifacts language
and symbols to enable reflexivity, it is contextualized in social experience.
This conceptualization offers elements of answers to some of the critiques that have
been addressed at knowledge-based theories of the firm, and knowledge management:
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- It provides a clearly articulated definition of knowledge, which explicits the
relationships between knowledge in individuals and knowledge in organizations. As
such, it can be argued that the concept of knowledge as a complex system emerging
from uncertainty reduction provides the micro-foundations for a knowledge-based
theory of the firm, where firms are devices that reduce uncertainty for individuals in
two ways. Firms reduce procedural uncertainty by accommodating some of the
cognitive limitations of individuals, and they reduce fundamental uncertainty by
stabilizing individual behavior, making the actions of others less unpredictable. It is
worth noting here that from this firms do not emerge because of behavioral
characteristics of people (e.g. Conner & Prahalad, 1996), nor because other
institutions are dysfunctional (e.g. Williamson, 1975).
- As a system of connections between fats and ideas, it is difficult to think of
knowledge as an asset: the growth of new knowledge may involve the creation and
destruction of connections, so it is possible that the growth of knowledge is
accompanied by a decrease or an increase in connections. This is consistent with the
conclusion that knowledge itself cannot be managed, only the context in which it
unfolds. This conclusion does not deny the possibility and salience of knowledge-
based assets, on the contrary, but it makes it cleat that the processes by which they are
obtained cannot be reliably directed ex-ante, only recorded ex-post.
- Acknowledging the interdependence between the four deformation dimensions
(personal, common, tacit, explicit) allows to account for the richness of the
manifestations of knowledge, and does not lead to privilege one dimension over
another.
- The notion that knowledge is a concept system allows to account for its procedural
and dynamic nature.
- The perspective of complexity leads to think about the manager's role in terms of
second-order complexity. This has led to outline the role of managers not as directing
other people, but as enabling the performance of collaborators by shaping the
organizational context (rules, values, boundaries).
Finally, it must be acknowledge that this conceptual discussion is only a first step
towards a complexity theory of knowledge: the arguments put forward here have to be
tested through action, and through intersubjective evaluation. Further, much work
remains to be done: if the concepts proposed here are valid, then that many of the
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tools available in the social sciences at large, including economics and management,
have to be revisited as they incorporate -at best- only partial concepts of knowledge.
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